Somebody Call My Doctor:  Repeal of the Treating Physician Rule in Social Security Disability Adjudication by Terranova, Charles
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 68 Number 3 Article 5 
5-1-2020 
Somebody Call My Doctor: Repeal of the Treating Physician Rule 
in Social Security Disability Adjudication 
Charles Terranova 
Buffalo Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the Social Welfare 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles Terranova, Somebody Call My Doctor: Repeal of the Treating Physician Rule in Social Security 
Disability Adjudication, 68 Buff. L. Rev. 931 (2020). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol68/iss3/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
 931 
Buffalo Law Review 
VOLUME 68 MAY 2020 NUMBER 3 
Somebody Call My Doctor:  
Repeal of the Treating Physician Rule in 
Social Security Disability Adjudication 
CHARLES TERRANOVA† 
INTRODUCTION 
Millions of Americans depend on disability benefits 
programs managed by the Social Security Administration 
(“SSA”). In the mid-2010s, an uptick in applications and 
administrative appeals sparked a crisis for both the Agency 
and program beneficiaries.1 Although a sizeable percentage 
of the federal budget is dedicated to Social Security, funding 
has failed to keep pace with the rising number of claims.2 As 
a result, administrative law judges (“ALJs”) face crushing 
backlogs of cases,3 and claimants wait in line for nearly two 
 
† J.D. Candidate, University at Buffalo School of Law. 
 1. Terrence McCoy, 597 Days. And Still Waiting., WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/local/2017/11/20/10000-people-died-
waiting-for-a-disability-decision-in-the-past-year-will-he-be-next/?utm_term=. 
d981cbd003a8 (stating that 10,000 people died while waiting for a decision on a 
disability benefits claim). 
 2. See id. (describing the budget as “stagnant”). 
 3. Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus, Crushed, JUDICATURE, Autumn 2017, 
at 65, 66 (“To forestall an intolerable backlog, the Social Security Administration 
expects Administrative Law Judges to render an average of 500 to 700 ‘legally 
sufficient’ decisions each year.”). Administrative Law Judges are the officers 
charged with disability hearing adjudication. See infra Section I.B. 
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years before sitting for a hearing.4 As one ALJ bluntly 
remarked, “We have decided it’s better for people to die than 
to adequately fund this program.”5 
This problem is partly attributable to the role of the 
federal courts in SSA disability determinations.6 Appeals of 
disability decisions weigh heavily on a district judge’s docket. 
In 2016, for instance, these cases dwarfed the number of 
appeals of other administrative agency decisions and 
constituted seven percent of all district court filings 
nationwide.7 Furthermore, the judges who hear these cases 
sometimes feel ill-equipped to address the relevant issues in 
disability cases.8 Although district court judges are 
experienced in trial work, disability cases require them to 
work in an appellate capacity.9 The disconnect between the 
trial judge’s skill set and the nature of the work leads to 
frustration and despair.10 Relatedly, SSA has suggested 
judicial misapplication of the standard of review causes high 
rates of remands to the Agency,11 which in turn creates more 
work for the already burnt-out ALJs. 
 
 4. Gelbach & Marcus, supra note 3; see also Lizzie O’Leary, Peter Balonon-
Rosen, & Sean McHenry, Wait Times for Social Security Benefit Appeals Leave 
People in Limbo, MARKETPLACE (Oct. 20, 2017, 4:38 PM), https://www. 
marketplace.org/2017/10/20/world/wait-times-social-security-disability-benefit-
hearings-leave-people-limbo. 
 5. McCoy, supra note 1. 
 6. Final Agency determinations regarding disability are reviewable by 
federal district courts. See infra Part I. 
 7. JONAH GELBACH & DAVID MARCUS, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A 
STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 4, 9–10 (2016). 
 8. See id. at 10 n.21. 
 9. Id. at 10. 
 10. Id. One federal judge described Social Security cases as “the bane of 
[district court judges’] existence” and another remarked that disability appeals 
are “horribly ill fit for the skill set of Article III judges and clerks.” Id. at 10 n.21. 
 11. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 
Fed. Reg. 62,560, 62,572 (proposed Sept. 9, 2016) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 
404, 416) (“[T]hese courts, in reviewing final agency decisions, are reweighing 
evidence instead of applying the substantial evidence standard of review . . . .”). 
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In 2017, SSA promulgated sweeping regulatory reform 
in part to relieve the burden of remands from federal courts. 
Most notably for this Comment, the Agency repealed the 
decades-old “treating physician rule.” This rule, which is 
used to evaluate medical opinion evidence, caused frequent 
remands. Both Agency adjudicators and federal judges alike 
struggled to apply the old-fashioned rule to the modern 
landscape of healthcare delivery and physician-patient 
relationships. By repealing the rule, remands may decrease, 
and systemic tensions may decline. 
The benefits of increased judicial and administrative 
economy through repeal of the treating physician rule could 
be significant. However, increasing efficiency may also cause 
a decline in fairness to individual participants in the legal 
system.12 The Social Security Act, which is the law that 
established federal disability programs, is a remedial and 
inclusive statute designed to provide relief from life’s 
hardships.13 To maintain the spirit of the statute, fairness 
must not be sacrificed at the altar of efficiency. While the 
treating physician rule needed reform, it also provided for 
fair consideration of the claimant’s medical evidence in 
certain contexts. Thus, steps should be taken to mitigate the 
potential negative consequences the repeal might bring for 
claimants. 
This Comment provides an in-depth examination of the 
repeal of the treating physician rule in Social Security 
Disability law. Part I explains the fundamental legal 
principles of SSA disability determinations. Part II discusses 
the historical development of the treating physician rule, the 
 
 12. See, e.g., Elijah Yip & Eric K. Yamamoto, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 
Jurisprudence of Process and Procedure, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 647, 667 (1998) 
(explaining that procedural values of efficiency and fairness often collide and 
overlap). 
 13. See Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1979) (“The Social 
Security Act is a remedial statute which must be ‘liberally applied’; its intent is 
inclusion rather than exclusion.”); Rodriguez v. Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 494, 496 (1st 
Cir. 1965) (“[T]he Social Security Act is to be construed liberally to effectuate its 
general purpose of easing the insecurity of life . . . .”). 
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Agency justifications for repealing it, and the current state 
of the law. Finally, Part III examines two circumstances 
where the treating physician rule’s repeal may impact the 
rights of claimants: cases where a claimant’s mental health 
is at issue and the qualified right to subpoena physicians for 
disability hearings. Part III also suggests regulatory changes 
which seek to maintain the bulk of SSA’s policy overhaul 
while addressing the potential adverse effects of repealing 
the treating physician rule. 
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I. THE BASICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW AND PRACTICE 
This Part will explain the fundamental concepts of Social 
Security Disability law. First, I provide a brief historical 
overview and substantive discussion of the Social Security 
Act. The next section explains the adjudication process for 
disability claims. Finally, I explore the meaning of “disabled” 
under the Social Security Act and explain how adjudicators 
apply that definition to make decisions on claims. 
A. A Brief Overview of the Social Security Act and 
Disability Benefits 
The Social Security Act (“the Act”) was signed into law 
on August 14, 1935, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.14 
The Act originally contained no provisions relating to 
disability benefits.15 However, in 1956, the law was amended 
to provide benefits to disabled workers.16 Upon authorizing 
the amendments, President Dwight Eisenhower promised to 
administer disability benefits “efficiently and effectively.”17 
In 1972, the Act was amended again to include the 
Supplemental Security Income program, which is still in 
effect today.18 
The modern Social Security Act provides disability 
benefits through two programs administered by the Social 
Security Administration: Social Security Disability 
Insurance (“SSDI”) and Supplemental Security Income 
(“SSI”). To qualify for SSDI, a person must demonstrate past 
employment and payment into the Social Security program 
through taxes.19 By contrast, SSI has no past employment or 
 
 14. OFFICE OF RET. & DISABILITY POLICY, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 1 
(2017) [hereinafter DISABILITY REPORT]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Nate Ghubril, Social Security Disability Reform: Steps Toward Economic 
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tax payment requirement; the program is distributed to 
those in financial need.20 Both programs require 
beneficiaries to show they are disabled within the meaning 
of the Social Security Act.21 
The Social Security Administration is an independent 
agency that administers disability benefits programs. The 
Agency is the largest provider of social welfare in the United 
States and accounts for twenty-two percent of the federal 
government’s total costs.22 It is headed by the Commissioner 
of Social Security (“the Commissioner”). This position 
requires nomination by the President and confirmation by 
the U.S. Senate.23 Appointees serve for a term of six years,24 
meaning the office is somewhat isolated from partisan 
politics. The current Commissioner, Andrew M. Saul, was 
appointed by President Donald J. Trump and sworn in on 
June 17, 2019.25 
B. The Journey of a Claim from Online Application to 
Federal Court 
A claim for disability benefits begins with an online or 
paper application.26 The claimant provides SSA with 
information about her work history, medical conditions, 
doctors, and other health care providers.27 After receiving the 
 
Efficiency and Improved Claimant Care, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 549, 554 (2013). 
 20. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (2012). 
 21. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382c(a)(3) (2012). 
 22. STEVEN T. MNUCHIN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REPORT OF 
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 3 (2017). 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1) (2012); see also U.S. CONST. art. II. 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3). 
 25. Jim Borland, Social Security Welcomes its New Commissioner, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN. BLOG (June 17, 2019), https://blog.ssa.gov/social-security-welcomes-its-
new-commissioner/. 
 26. Emily C. Russell & Hon. Glynn F. Voisin, A Primer on Social Security 
Disability Law, 62 LOY. L. REV. 829, 834 (2016). 
 27. See Disability Benefits, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., www.ssa.gov/benefits/disability/ 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2018). 
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application, the Agency develops the claimant’s medical 
history by requesting records from the claimant’s medical 
sources.28 The Agency then makes an initial determination 
whether the claimant is disabled.29 If the Agency finds the 
claimant disabled, she is eligible for benefits.30 In 2016, only 
35.4% of applicants prevailed at the first level of disability 
adjudication.31 
A claimant who receives an unfavorable initial 
decision—a finding of “not disabled”—may file for 
reconsideration within sixty days.32 If the claimant is 
unsatisfied with the decision after reconsideration, she may 
request a hearing with an ALJ.33 The ALJ reviews the claim 
de novo to determine whether the claimant is disabled.34 
Prior to the hearing date, the ALJ continues to collect the 
claimant’s medical evidence and fully develops the facts of 
the case.35 During the hearing, the ALJ elicits testimony 
from the claimant and any lay or expert witnesses called to 
 
 28. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b), 416.912(b) (2016). 
 29. Russell & Voisin, supra note 26, at 834. 
 30. In addition to proving disability, claimants must also demonstrate either 
the work requirements for SSDI or the needs-based qualifications for SSI. See 
supra Section I.A. Generally, regulations pertaining to disability determination 
for SSDI are codified at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, and for SSI at Part 416. However, the 
adjudication process is similar for both programs. See Ghubril, supra note 19, at 
554–55. 
 31. DISABILITY REPORT, supra note 14, at 159. 
 32. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.909(a)(1), 416.1409(a) (2016). Some commentators have 
suggested eliminating reconsideration from the disability adjudication process. 
See, e.g., FRANK S. BLOCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS PROCESS 363 (1989). 
 33. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.930, 416.1430 (2018). 
 34. Oren R. Griffin, Social Security Disability Law and the Obstacles Facing 
Claimants with Mental Disabilities, 36 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 147, 153 (2012). 
 35. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b), 416.912(b) (2018) (detailing SSA’s duty to 
request medical evidence); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (“The 
social security hearing examiner, furthermore, does not act as counsel. He acts 
as an examiner charged with developing the facts.”); Snead v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 
834, 838 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Well-settled precedent confirms that the ALJ bears a 
responsibility to develop the record fairly and fully, independent of the claimant’s 
burden to press his case.”). 
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provide information relevant to the case.36 Once the ALJ 
makes a determination, she issues a written opinion 
detailing the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
underlying her decision.37 If the ALJ gives an unfavorable 
decision, the claimant may request review by the SSA 
Appeals Council.38 The decision of the Appeals Council is 
binding.39 If a claimant receives an unfavorable decision 
from the Appeals Council, she has exhausted all available 
administrative remedies.40 
If the claimant receives an unfavorable final 
determination from the Appeals Council, she may file a civil 
action against the Commissioner of Social Security in a 
federal district court.41 Procedurally, the parties file cross-
motions for judgment on the pleadings and the district court 
judge disposes of the case by granting either the plaintiff’s 
motion or the Commissioner’s motion.42 The Court has 
authority to uphold, reverse, or remand the Commissioner’s 
determination of disability.43 However, the Court is bound to 
uphold the Commissioner’s findings of fact if they are 
supported by “substantial evidence.”44 Decisions on claims by 
 
 36. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929, 416.1429 (2018); Griffin, supra note 34, at 154. 
 37. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.917, 416.1417 (2018). 
 38. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967, 416.1467 (2018). 
 39. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481 (2018). 
 40. See id.; see also Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite 
at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security 
Administration’s Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 231 (1990). 
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. 
 42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c); Igonia v. Califano, 568 F.2d 1383, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (explaining that the Social Security Act “directs the court to enter its 
judgment upon the pleadings and the transcript of the record”). There is no 
discovery in Social Security cases because the evidentiary record is developed at 
the administrative level. 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012). 
 44. Id. See also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (defining the 
substantial evidence standard as “more than a mere scintilla” and “such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”); Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003) 
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district court judges may be appealed to the United States 
Circuit Courts of Appeals and subsequently to the Supreme 
Court of the United States.45 
C. Determining Disability 
The definition of “disabled” found in the Social Security 
Act is complex and narrow. A person is disabled when he is 
unable to engage in “substantial gainful activity”46 because 
of a physical or mental impairment expected to last longer 
than twelve months or result in death.47 The impairment 
must be so severe that it precludes the person from doing any 
past work, or any other kind of work the person could do 
considering his work experience, education, and age.48 If a 
person has multiple impairments, the combined impact of 
those impairments on the person’s ability to work must be 
considered throughout disability determination.49 
The Act authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate 
regulations to carry out disability programs.50 Thus, SSA 
devised a regulatory scheme—known as the “five-step 
 
(“[T]he Commissioner’s decision cannot be overturned if substantial evidence, or 
even a preponderance of the evidence, supports the claimant’s position, so long 
as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ.”); 
Jesurum v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 
(3d Cir. 1995) (“[Substantial evidence] is less than a preponderance of the 
evidence but more than a mere scintilla.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Biestek v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 880 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. 
granted, 138 S. Ct. 2677 (2018). 
 46. The phrase “substantial gainful activity” is defined in regulations. 
Activity is “substantial” if it involves “doing significant physical or mental 
activities” and “gainful” if it is done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is 
realized. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572, 416.972. Even unlawful work—such as 
prostitution—may qualify as substantial gainful activity. See Margaret A. 
Baldwin, “A Million Dollars and an Apology”: Prostitution and Public Benefits 
Claims, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 189, 216–18 (1999). 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a)–(b). 
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sequential evaluation process”—for disability adjudication51:  
(1) If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, he is 
not disabled.52 
(2) If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the 
agency determines whether the claimant has a severe mental or 
physical impairment, or a combination of impairments that is 
severe. If the claimant does not have a severe impairment (or a 
severe combination), he is not disabled.53 
(3) If the claimant has a severe impairment, SSA determines 
whether one of the claimant’s impairments meets or equals a 
“listing.”54 If an impairment meets this level of severity, the 
claimant is disabled; if an impairment does not meet this level, SSA 
proceeds to Step Four.55 
(4) SSA considers the claimant’s ability to perform past work. If the 
claimant can perform any of his past work, he is not disabled; if he 
cannot perform any of his past work, SSA moves to Step Five.56 
(5) If a claimant cannot perform his past work, SSA considers 
whether there are any jobs the claimant could perform considering 
his vocational background and medical impairments. If the 
claimant can perform other work, he is not disabled; if he cannot 
perform other work, he is disabled.57 
Before proceeding to step four, SSA assesses the 
claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”). RFC is 
“the most you can still do despite your limitations.”58 
 
 51. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v) (2018); see also 
Russell & Voisin, supra note 26, at 836 (providing a graphic representation of the 
five-step sequential process). 
 52. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). 
 53. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). 
 54. “Listings” refer to a listing of impairments contained in the first appendix 
to 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P. If a claimant can demonstrate he meets the 
requirements found in a listing, he is disabled. 
 55. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). 
 56. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). 
 57. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). 
 58. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1) (2018); see also Jon C. Dubin, 
Overcoming Gridlock: Campbell After a Quarter-Century and Bureaucratically 
Rational Gap-Filling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the Social Security 
Administration’s Disability Programs, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 937, 974 (2010). 
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Specifically, SSA evaluates the claimant’s ability to meet the 
physical, mental, and sensory demands of work.59 SSA 
considers all the relevant medical evidence in the claimant’s 
record to determine the extent of the claimant’s physical,60 
mental,61 and other abilities.62 RFC is applied at step four to 
determine if the claimant can do any past work, and at step 
five to determine if there are any other jobs in the national 
economy the claimant could do.63 
The claimant carries the burden of proof through the 
first four steps, either to refute a finding of “not disabled” or 
to demonstrate a finding of “disabled.”64 At step five, the 
burden shifts to SSA.65 If the claim proceeds to step five, then 
the Agency must prove what other work the claimant could 
perform.66 During a hearing, an ALJ elicits testimony from a 
Vocational Expert (“VE”), who opines about specific jobs the 
claimant could or could not perform considering the 
claimant’s RFC.67 For cases that reach the hearing stage, the 
VE testimony is central to SSA’s determination at step five.68 
Medical evidence is essential to the five-step process and 
disability determinations in general. SSA relies on several 
types of evidence to determine whether or not an individual 
is disabled: (1) objective medical evidence, (2) medical 
 
 59. §§ 404.1545(a)(4), 416.945(a)(4). 
 60. §§ 404.1545(b), 416.945(b) (including, for example, the ability to sit, stand, 
walk, lift, carry, push, and pull). 
 61. §§ 404.1545(c), 416.945(c) (including the ability to understand, remember, 
carry out instructions, and deal with workplace stress). 
 62. §§ 404.1545(d), 416.945(d) (including abilities limited by impairments of 
vision and hearing). 
 63. §§ 404.1545(a)(5), 416.945(a)(5). 
 64. Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Nathaniel O. Hubley, The Untouchables: Why a Vocational Expert’s 
Testimony in Social Security Hearings Cannot Be Touched, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 
353, 368–70 (2008). 
 68. Id. at 377–78. 
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opinions, (3) other medical evidence, (4) evidence from non-
medical sources, and (5) prior administrative medical 
findings.69 “Objective medical evidence” includes medical 
signs70 and laboratory findings.71 A “medical opinion” is a 
statement from a medical source explaining what a disability 
claimant can still do despite his physical, mental, or sensory 
impairments.72 “Other medical evidence” includes any 
evidence from a medical source other than objective medical 
evidence or medical opinions.73 The fourth category, 
“evidence from nonmedical sources,” introduces the 
distinction between medical and nonmedical sources. 
Medical sources include physicians, psychologists, speech-
language pathologists, registered nurses, and physician 
assistants.74 Nonmedical sources include the claimant’s own 
testimony, school teachers, public and private social welfare 
personnel, and the claimant’s friends and family.75 
The claimant bears the ultimate responsibility for 
submitting medical evidence in support of her claim.76 
However, if the Agency cannot decide a claim based on the 
evidence submitted, it will purchase a consultative 
examination (“CE”) to develop the record.77 The CE is a 
 
 69. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513, 416.913 (2018). 
 70. A medical “sign” is “one or more anatomical, physiological, or 
psychological abnormalities that can be observed, apart from your statements 
(symptoms).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(g). Signs must be observable through 
“medically acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques.” Id. 
 71. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513, 416.913. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. This category includes judgments about the nature and severity of a 
claimant’s conditions, medical history, diagnoses, and prognoses. 
 74. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502(a), 416.902(a) (2018). 
 75. §§ 404.1502(e), 416.902(j). 
 76. §§ 404.1512, 416.912 (“In general, you have to prove to us that you are 
blind or disabled.”). 
 77. §§ 404.1517, 416.917; Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Paul R. 
Verkuil, Developing a Full and Fair Evidentiary Record in a Nonadversary 
Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security Disability Adjudications, 
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2003). 
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physical or mental examination by a health care provider 
purchased by the Agency to provide additional information 
to aid in disability determination. Specifically, the CE 
physician examines the claimant and produces a report.78 
The report should provide a summary of the claimant’s 
medical history, objective medical findings, and an opinion 
statement about the activities the claimant can still do 
despite her impairments.79 The regulations suggest that the 
Agency should ask a claimant’s own physician or other 
treating source to perform the CE,80 but in practice the 
examiner is rarely the claimant’s doctor.81 
  
 
 78. DAVID WITTENBURG ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF CONSULTATIVE EXAMINATION 
(CE) PROCESSES, CONTENT, AND QUALITY: FINDINGS FROM THE CE REVIEW DATA  
10–12 (2012). 
 79. Id. 
 80. §§ 404.1519h, 416.919h. But see §§ 404.1519i, 416.919i (explaining 
situations where a claimant’s medical source will not be used). 
 81. See WITTENBURG, supra note 78, at 26–27 (in a study on consultative 
examinations, only five percent were performed by a treating source). 
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II. THE TREATING PHYSICIAN RULE & ARTICULATION 
REQUIREMENTS: APPLICATION, HISTORY, & REPEAL 
Part I of this Comment explored the basic legal 
principles behind Social Security Disability law. This Part 
will provide an in-depth examination of the treating 
physician rule, from its inception in the mid-twentieth 
century to its repeal in 2017. First, I will discuss the origin 
of the rule and its development over time. Next, I will discuss 
the way federal judges and ALJs applied the rule before 
2017. This Part ends with a discussion of the rule’s repeal 
and what, if anything, remains of the rule post-2017. 
Broadly stated, the treating physician rule (or “treating 
source rule”) is an evidentiary rule that regulates the 
influence of medical opinion evidence on disability 
determinations. When the administrative record contains 
one or more medical opinions, adjudicators must decide how 
much “weight,” or persuasive value, each opinion has in 
relation to the other opinions and other types of evidence in 
the record. For many decades, the treating physician rule 
guided adjudicators in the task of weighing opinion evidence. 
While slight variations developed over time, the rule’s core 
idea remained: the opinion of a claimant’s treating source 
deserves great weight because of her unique perspective on 
the claimant’s conditions.82 A treating source is a physician 
or other medical source with an “ongoing treatment 
relationship” with the claimant.83 The rule applies only to a 
 
 82. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2) (2018); Rosa v. 
Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 78–79 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The opinion of a treating physician 
is given controlling weight if it is well supported by medical findings and not 
inconsistent with other substantial evidence.”); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
127 F.3d 525, 529–30 (6th Cir. 1997) (“In general, the opinions of treating 
physicians are accorded greater weight than those of physicians who examine 
claimants only once.”); Heslep v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 891, 894 (4th Cir. 1966) 
(reversing the Commissioner’s decision partly because he “unwarrantedly 
disregarded the testimony of Dr. Smith, the treating physician.”). 
 83. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (2018) (“Generally, we will consider that you 
have an ongoing treatment relationship with an acceptable medical source when 
the medical evidence establishes that you see, or have seen, the source with a 
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physician’s findings concerning the nature and severity of a 
claimant’s conditions; it does not apply to issues reserved for 
the Commissioner such as whether the claimant is disabled 
as a matter of law.84 This Part explores three distinct periods 
of treating physician doctrine: early common-law 
applications, the 1991–2016 regulatory regime, and the 2017 
repeal. 
A. Common-Law Origins and Inception of the Treating 
Physician Rule 
Understanding the development of the treating 
physician rule over time is important for understanding the 
rule’s use as a tool of federal courts to ensure fair 
consideration of evidence in disability cases. Indeed, the rule 
originated as a judicial construct.85 As Justice Ginsburg once 
observed, it was “originally developed by Courts of Appeals 
as a means to control disability determinations by 
administrative law judges under the Social Security Act.”86 
 
frequency consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of treatment 
and/or evaluation required for your medical condition(s).”). Courts have typically 
decided on a case-by-case basis whether or not a treating physician relationship 
exists. See, e.g., Jasen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-6153P, 2017 WL 3722454 
at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2017) (“[I]t is unclear whether [the physician] qualifies 
as a treating physician because the record suggests that she met with [the 
claimant] on only two occasions before rendering her opinion . . . .”); Patterson v. 
Astrue, No. 5:11-CV-1143 (MAD/DEP), 2013 WL 638617 at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 
2013) (“[T]hree examinations by [a physician] over the course of four months . . . 
does not constitute the type of ‘ongoing relationship’ that is required for finding 
that s/he is plaintiff’s treating physician . . . .”). 
 84. West v. Barnhart, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1222 (D. Kan. 2003) (“A treating 
physician’s opinion of an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as disability, 
is not controlling because determining the ultimate issue is the responsibility of 
the Commissioner.”). 
 85. See Rachel Schneider, A Role for the Courts: Treating Physician Evidence 
in Social Security Disability Determinations, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 391, 
396 (1996). 
 86. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 829 (2003). This 
case was not a Social Security case; rather, the Court answered the question of 
whether the treating physician rule used in SSA disability determinations also 
applies to disability determinations under employee benefits plans covered by 
ERISA. 
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Each Circuit Court articulated the rule somewhat 
differently. For example, the Tenth Circuit required the 
Commissioner to give “substantial weight” to a treating 
physician’s testimony, unless she could show “good cause” for 
disregarding the testimony.87 The Second Circuit required 
particularly strict deference to the treating physician: a 
treating physician’s opinion was binding on the fact-finder 
unless substantial evidence contradicted that opinion.88 By 
contrast, the First Circuit used a much less deferential 
standard, holding that a treating physician’s opinion is “not 
necessarily entitled” to more weight than a physician who 
has only examined a claimant once.89 
In the late 1980s, the Second Circuit’s highly deferential 
formulation of the treating physician rule became the subject 
of three class action suits: Schisler I, II, and III.90 As 
explained below, the plaintiffs in these suits sought to force 
SSA to comply with the Second Circuit’s formulation of the 
rule. Ultimately, the decisions in Schisler I and II prompted 
the Agency to codify the treating physician rule in federal 
regulations, which were upheld by the Second Circuit in 
Schisler III. 
In Schisler I, the plaintiff class of disability claimants 
challenged termination decisions by SSA,91 arguing that 
benefits were wrongfully terminated pursuant to an 
arbitrarily imposed evidentiary standard.92 After a 
 
 87. Id.; Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 88. Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 89. Sitar v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing Perez v. 
Secretary of HEW, 622 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1980)). 
 90. Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Schisler I”); Schisler v. 
Bowen, 851 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Schisler II”); Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563 
(2d Cir. 1993) (“Schisler III”); see also Schneider, supra note 85, at 398–400. 
 91. Schisler I, 787 F.2d at 78. 
 92. Id. As explained by the Schisler I court, SSA changed the standard for 
benefits termination in 1976 without any relevant statutory change. Before 1976, 
SSA used a “medical improvement” standard for termination which required the 
Agency to demonstrate a claimant’s medical condition had improved after he 
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complicated series of procedural steps,93 the plaintiffs moved 
for an injunction that would require SSA to comply with the 
Second Circuit’s treating physician rule.94 The motion was 
denied, and plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit.95 On 
appeal, the Court reversed the district judge’s order denying 
the plaintiffs’ motion. In its opinion, the Court noted that 
SSA had consistently failed to apply the treating physician 
rule in practice, as evidenced by the high volume of ALJ 
decisions vacated by federal courts on the basis of the rule.96 
Additionally, the Court suggested that if SSA wished not to 
abide by the Second Circuit’s rule, it should have sought 
review in the Supreme Court.97 To ensure compliance with 
the rule, the Court remanded the case to the district court 
and ordered SSA to produce “relevant publications” 
instructing disability adjudicators to apply the Second 
Circuit’s formulation of the rule.98 
On remand, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
proposed a draft Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)99 attempting 
 
began receiving benefits. This standard was changed in 1976 to a “current 
disability” standard, which allowed for termination of benefits if the claimant 
could not produce substantial evidence of continuing disability regardless of 
whether there was medical improvement. In 1984, Congress passed the Social 
Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, which reinstated the medical 
improvement standard. See Eileen P. Sweeney, The New “Medical Improvement” 
Standard In Social Security and SSI Disability Cases, 14 SOC. SEC. REP. SERV. 
965, 967 (1986). 
 93. The district court judge found in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering that class 
members’ termination decisions be “expeditiously remanded” for further 
administrative proceedings. Subsequently, both the plaintiffs and the Agency 
moved to amend the judgment. The Agency sought to reduce the size of the 
plaintiff class, while plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring SSA to follow the 
Second Circuit formulation of the treating physician rule. Schisler I, 787 F.2d at 
78. 
 94. Schisler I, 787 F.2d at 78. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 82 (“[C]ases reversing SSA in district courts and in this court on 
[the treating physician rule] are ‘almost legion.’”). 
 97. Id. at 83. 
 98. Id. at 84. 
 99. Social Security Rulings are publications made under the Commissioner’s 
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to enshrine the Second Circuit’s treating physician rule as 
official administrative policy.100 However, the district court 
found the draft SSR’s articulation of the rule deviated 
considerably from Second Circuit caselaw.101 The district 
court subsequently edited the draft SSR to more accurately 
reflect Second Circuit precedent and to follow the Court’s 
order in Schisler I.102 SSA appealed, claiming the district 
court exceeded its authority by rewriting the draft SSR.103 
The decision on that appeal became known as Schisler II. 
In Schisler II, the Second Circuit largely upheld the 
district court’s revisions and added a few revisions of its own. 
It reasoned that if SSA wanted to substantively elaborate on 
the treating physician rule, it would need to resort to 
“customary administrative processes.”104 The final version of 
the SSR approved by the Second Circuit purported to contain 
“nothing that is not clearly authorized by [Second Circuit] 
caselaw.”105 
In 1991, SSA published new regulations creating a 
uniform treating physician rule through formal notice and 
comment rulemaking.106 Plaintiffs challenged these 
regulations in Schisler III, claiming the new regulations—
which deviated from the Second Circuit’s judge-made 
 
authority that reflect the administration’s interpretations of the law. These 
rulings do not have the effects or force of law, but are binding upon SSA 
employees and adjudicators.  Social Security and Acquiescence Rulings, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/rulings-pref.html (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2020). 
 100. Schisler II, 851 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 101. Id. For example, the draft SSR made the treating physician rule one of 
several factors an adjudicator considered rather than making the treating 
physician’s opinion binding on the adjudicator. Id. 
 102. Id. at 45. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 46. 
 106. Standards for Consultative Examinations and Existing Medical Evidence, 
56 Fed. Reg. 36,932 (Aug. 1, 1991); Schneider, supra note 85, at 400. This 
regulatory scheme is discussed further in Section II.B infra. 
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treating physician rule—violated the previous holdings in 
Schisler I and II.107 In this final iteration of the Schisler saga, 
the court sided with SSA. It held that SSA had statutory 
authority to create a regulatory scheme regarding the weight 
to be afforded to a treating physician’s opinion.108 Despite 
various departures from Second Circuit caselaw, the new 
rules were neither arbitrary nor capricious and thus valid.109 
Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court’s decision 
that the new regulations were not binding on the courts.110 
Under the decision in Schisler III, Agency regulations 
prevailed as the highest authority on deference to the 
treating physician.111 
As stated in the beginning of this Section, the history of 
the rule and the challenges it faced show how federal courts 
sought to use the rule to constrain SSA and promote fair 
consideration of a claimant’s medical evidence. Under the 
Social Security Act, courts may only overturn an 
administrative decision if the decision is not supported by 
substantial evidence.112 Since there is no explicit statutory 
authority for the treating physician rule, its genesis and 
subsequent affirmations in the Schisler cases are properly 
viewed as judicial elaboration of the substantial evidence 
standard. Essentially, an administrative decision which does 
not consider the opinion of a treating physician is not a 
decision supported by substantial evidence.113 This 
 
 107. Schisler III, 3 F.3d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 108. Id. at 564. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 565. 
 111. See Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 503 (2d Cir. 1998) (“In Schisler III, we 
upheld the new regulations and clarified that they superseded the more 
deferential treating physician rule previously in force in this Circuit.”). 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). 
 113. See Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 412 (10th Cir. 1983) (“In 
determining the question of substantiality of evidence, the reports of physicians 
who have treated a patient over a period of time or who are consulted for purposes 
of treatment are given greater weight than are reports of physicians employed 
950 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
construction of the law ensured that administrative 
decisions were guided by physicians with a complete and 
intimate understanding of a claimant’s conditions. 
B. Applying the Treating Physician Rule: Weighing Opinion 
Evidence for Claims Filed Before March 27, 2017 
The regulatory regime established post-Schisler is still 
applied by Agency adjudicators and federal courts for all 
claims filed before March 27, 2017.114 Under the regulations, 
SSA ordinarily defers to the opinions of a claimant’s treating 
source.115 The rules explain that treating sources are “most 
able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture” of a 
claimant’s medical impairments and “may bring a unique 
perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained 
from the objective medical findings alone . . . .”116 If a treating 
source’s opinion is supported by other substantial evidence 
in a claimant’s record, SSA gives the opinion “controlling 
weight.”117 If the Agency does not give a treating source’s 
 
and paid by the government . . . .”) (emphasis added); Richard E. Levy & Robert 
L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 546–47 (2011). In 
the article by Professors Levy and Glicksman, two views are advanced regarding 
the relationship between the treating physician rule and the substantial evidence 
standard. On one hand, it may be that where an ALJ does not explain his 
rejection of a treating physician in favor of a consulting physician, there is not 
enough evidence such that a “reasonable mind” could come to the same conclusion 
as the ALJ, and therefore the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 
On the other hand, it may be that the treating physician rule arose out of “judicial 
mistrust” of the SSA and is not really an application of the substantial evidence 
standard. 
 114. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927 (2018); see also Michael N. Rhinehart, 
Treating Physician Rule Eliminated in Social Security Regulations, FED. LAW., 
Oct.–Nov. 2017, at 5, 5 (“The regulations in effect before March 27, 2017, 
generally provide for the giving of greater weight to the opinion of a treating 
physician over the opinion of a one-time examining physician.”). 
 115. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.; see also Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1995) (treating 
physician’s opinion not entitled to controlling weight where the physician did not 
provide a medical explanation for his opinion and was contradicted by two other 
opinions); Franklin v. Shalala, 876 F. Supp. 168, 173 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (treating 
source not given controlling weight where the source opined on issues reserved 
2020] SOMEBODY CALL MY DOCTOR 951 
opinion controlling weight, it must apply a number of factors 
to determine how much weight to assign to that opinion.118 
Additionally, the Agency must provide in writing “good 
reasons” for the weight given to a claimant’s treating 
source.119 
While treating sources are given great weight, 
consulting sources (e.g., the physician who performs a 
claimant’s CE) are given limited weight.120 A consulting 
source is a medical source who has only examined the 
claimant once or twice during a limited time period. If 
opinions from a treating source and a consulting source are 
conflicting, the Agency should generally favor the treating 
source.121 However, the opinion of a consulting source 
properly overrides that of a treating physician if it is 
supported by substantial evidence and the treating source’s 
opinion is not.122 
The findings of nonexamining state agency consultants 
(or “reporting physicians”) are also considered expert opinion 
evidence.123 These consultants review the claimant’s medical 
 
for the commissioner); Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical 
Evidence, 81 Fed. Reg. 62,560, 62,572 (proposed Sept. 9, 2016) (to be codified at 
20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416) (“To give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight 
means to adopt it.”). 
 118. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2) (“When we do not give the treating 
source’s medical opinion controlling weight, we apply the factors listed in 
paragraphs (c)(2)(i) and (c)(2)(ii) of this section, as well as the factors in 
paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(6) of this section in determining the weight to give 
the medical opinion.”). 
 119. Id. (“We will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or 
decision for the weight we give your treating source’s medical opinion.”); see also 
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (“If a treating or examining 
doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only 
reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 
substantial evidence.”). 
 120. Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 121. See Camille v. Colvin, 104 F. Supp. 3d 329, 343 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 122. E.g., Jones v. Shalala, 900 F. Supp. 663, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Diaz 
v. Shalala, 59 F.3d 307, 313 n.5 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 123. Frye ex rel. A.O. v. Astrue, 485 F. App’x 484, 487 (summary order) (2d Cir. 
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records and produce a report for the Agency, but do not 
actually examine the claimant.124 The report is produced for 
the first level of adjudication, and must subsequently be 
evaluated by an ALJ at the hearing level.125 The opinions of 
state agency consultants are typically given limited 
weight.126 However, these opinions may be given more 
weight if they are corroborated by other evidence in the 
record.127 If the Agency gives great weight to a nonexamining 
source opinion, there must be sufficient reasons for doing so. 
For example, the source must provide a sufficient 
explanation for their opinion, or have a specialization 
relevant to the claimant’s conditions.128 
In sum, the pre-2017 rules for weighing medical opinion 
evidence focused around the relationship between the 
medical source and the claimant. SSA gave treating sources 
the greatest weight, while giving consulting sources and 
nonexamining sources the least weight. Generally, as the 
relationship between the claimant and the source became 
more attenuated, adjudicators applied greater scrutiny of the 
opinion when weighing it.129 The following section explains 
 
2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2)(i)) (“The report of a State agency medical 
consultant constitutes expert opinion evidence which can be given weight if 
supported by medical evidence in the record.”). 
 124. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513a, 416.913a (2018). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013); 
Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 967 (8th Cir. 2010); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 
821, 831 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 127. See, e.g., Camille v. Colvin, 104 F. Supp. 3d 329, 343 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(holding that a state agency consultant’s opinion was appropriately afforded 
greater weight than the treating physician where it was more consistent with the 
record). 
 128. See Social Security Ruling 96-6p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,466, 34,467 (July 2, 
1996) (stating that nonexamining source opinions should be weighted based on 
“medical evidence, qualifications, and explanations for the opinions”). 
 129. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 375 (“[T]he regulations provide progressively more 
rigorous tests for weighing opinions as the ties between the source of the opinion 
and the individual become weaker.” (quoting Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-6p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 
34,467)). 
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the reasons why this system was ultimately disposed of for 
all claims filed after March 27, 2017. 
C. Repeal of the Treating Physician Rule and Changes to 
the Policy for Weighing Medical Opinions 
On September 9, 2016, SSA published a notice of 
proposed rulemaking130 announcing major forthcoming 
revisions to medical evidence rules.131 One such revision, 
found under the heading “Consideration and Articulation of 
Medical Opinions and Prior Administrative Medical 
Findings,” suggested repealing the 1991 treating physician 
regulatory regime.132 The Agency laid out several 
“adjudicative issues” that arose from the treating physician 
rule and the general policy for weighing medical opinion 
evidence. In total, five reasons were given for repealing the 
rule.133 
First, the Agency pointed to the number of findings 
required by Agency adjudicators.134 While not expressly 
stated, this justification implied the rule imposed too heavy 
a burden on adjudicators to sustain, as the policy required 
adjudicators “to make a large number of findings that 
need[ed] to be included in their determinations and 
decisions.”135 Some files contained upwards of ten medical 
opinions, and the regulations required adjudicators to 
articulate reasons for assigning a particular weight to each 
 
 130. When SSA promulgates new regulations, it must follow the 
Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (procedure for agency 
rulemaking); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232–33 (1974) (explaining the purpose 
of providing public notice of proposed administrative rules). 
 131. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 62,560, 62,560 (proposed Sept. 9, 2016) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 
416). 
 132. Id. at 62,570.  
 133. Id. at 62,572–74. 
 134. Id. at 62,572. 
 135. Id. 
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opinion.136 The result was a high rate of remand from federal 
district courts on the grounds that ALJs failed to assign 
proper weight to one of the many opinions in the record.137 
This finding is well supported by data from SSA, which 
shows that 28.5% of federal court remands in 2018 were 
related to an ALJ’s misapplication of the treating physician 
rule.138 
The second reason for repeal, labeled “Federal Court 
Perspectives,” suggested that the rule influenced federal 
courts to misapply the “substantial evidence” standard of 
review.139 Rather than merely deciding whether the 
Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial 
evidence, reviewing courts improperly focused on whether 
the ALJ adequately articulated his reasons for rejecting a 
treating source opinion.140 By challenging the reasons given 
by ALJs for rejecting a treating source opinion, courts 
effectively reweighed the evidence instead of applying the 
deferential substantial evidence standard.141 SSA further 
noted that some courts recognized problems with the rule, 
 
 136. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c) (2018) (stating that SSA 
gives “good reasons” for assigning a particular weight to the medical opinions). 
 137. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 62,572.  
 138. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., TOP 10 REMAND REASONS CITED BY THE COURT ON 
REMANDS TO SSA, https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC08_Top_10_CR 
.html. In FY 2018, the top reason for remand was “Treating Source—Opinion 
Rejected Without Adequate Articulation,” representing 15.4% of all remands. 
Also related to the treating physician rule were “Consultative  
Examiner—Inadequate Support/Rationale for Weight Given Opinion” (7.0%), 
“Non-Examining Source—Inadequate Support/Rationale for Weight Given 
Opinion” (3.3%), and “Non-Examining Source—Opinion Accepted Without 
Adequate Articulation” (2.8%). 
 139. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 62,572. 
 140. Id.; see also ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., SSA DISABILITY BENEFITS 
PROGRAMS: ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF THE TREATING PHYSICIAN RULE 16 (2013). 
 141. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 62,572. But see Levy & Glicksman, supra note 113, at 546–47 (presenting 
the view that the treating physician rule may actually be an application of the 
substantial evidence standard). 
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such as the treating physician’s bias towards the claimant.142 
While the Supreme Court never directly weighed in on the 
issue, the Court cautioned in Black & Decker Disability Plan 
v. Nord that a treating physician’s bias towards her patient 
may unduly influence a finding of disabled.143 
Third, the Agency cited the Ninth Circuit’s “Credit-as-
True” rule as an example of an adjudicative issue related to 
the treating physician rule.144 The Credit-as-True rule 
provided a three-part test that, if satisfied, triggered 
immediate judgment for the claimant on the issue of 
disability rather than a remand to the Agency for further 
administrative proceedings.145 Combined with the treating 
physician rule, an ALJ’s failure to provide sufficient 
explanation for rejecting a treating source opinion could be 
grounds for this extraordinary remedy.146 The Agency stated 
that this rule denied it the opportunity to re-evaluate the 
evidentiary record and caused judicial encroachment on 
administrative power.147 While this rule was not applied 
outside the Ninth Circuit, the Agency’s concern was 
reasonable considering about twenty percent of the United 
States population falls within the Ninth’s jurisdiction.148 
 
 142. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 62,572–73; see Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he fact that the claimant is the treating physician’s patient also detracts 
from the weight of that physician’s testimony, since, as is well known, many 
physicians . . . will often bend over backwards to assist a patient in obtaining 
benefits.”). 
 143. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 62,572–73; 538 U.S. 822, 832 (2003). 
 144. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 62,573. 
 145. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2014). To 
grant this remedy, the Court remands to the Agency for the “calculation and 
award of benefits” rather than for re-examining the issue of disability. Id. at 1023. 
 146. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 62,573 (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 147. See id. (stating that the credit-as-true rule “effectively supplant[s] the 
judgment of our decision makers”). 
 148. Dylan Matthews, How the 9th Circuit Became Conservatives’ Least 
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The fourth reason for repealing the treating physician 
rule was “Difficulty Determining Treating Source Status 
Due to the Changing Nature of the Primary Healthcare 
System.”149 SSA argued that when the rule was promulgated 
in 1991, it was justified by the “unique perspective” a 
treating physician provided that could not be found by 
looking only at objective medical evidence.150 However, 
modern health care delivery had changed drastically since 
that time. Instead of developing a close relationship with one 
primary doctor, claimants now treat with “coordinated and 
managed care organizations.”151 These organizations are 
highly specialized, meaning each individual organization is 
unlikely to have a complete picture of a claimant’s medical 
situation.152 Because of the changing landscape of health 
care delivery, courts granted “treating source” status to 
providers who do not fit the traditional meaning of the 
term.153 In sum, the physician-patient relationship morphed 
into something so different than what it used to be that the 
modern “treating physician” does not deserve the kind of 
deference afforded under the treating physician rule.154 
 
Favorite Court, VOX (Jan. 10, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/1/10/16873718/ninth-circuit-court-appeals-liberal-conservative-
trump-tweet (“The Ninth [Circuit] covers a population of 64.3 million people . . . 
or nearly 20 percent of the US.”). 
 149. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 62,573. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. E.g., id. (listing “physicians with relatively sporadic treatment 
relationships to claimants,” “all members of a healthcare team,” and “a physician 
who coordinated care among medical sources but who did not personally examine 
the claimant” as examples of nontraditional treating sources identified by courts); 
see also Johnson v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 409, 411 (1st Cir. 2009); Shontos v. Barnhart, 
328 F.3d 418, 426 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 154. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 
Fed. Reg. at 62,573 (“This ‘devaluation’ of the physician-patient relationship calls 
into further question whether any deference—let alone ‘controlling weight’—
should be afforded to the opinions of this type of medical practitioner.”). 
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Finally, SSA cited scholarly criticism of the treating 
physician rule as a reason for repeal.155 The scholarly 
arguments cited mostly speak to the Agency’s second 
proposition, “Federal Court Perspectives,” which stated that 
the rule influences courts to improperly apply the 
substantial evidence standard.156 Thus, this reason is best 
understood as additional support for the Agency’s second 
argument instead of an independent justification. 
All the issues identified by SSA circle back to a central 
theme: tension between the federal court’s application of the 
treating physician rule and the Agency’s interest in 
independent and efficient administration of its programs. 
Essentially, the treating physician rule permitted a great 
degree of judicial scrutiny of Agency decisions.157 
Consequently, courts issued a high number of remands, 
which bogged down the administrative docket. The next 
section discusses how SSA addressed these issues and 
created the modern doctrine for weighing opinion evidence. 
D. Weighing Opinion Evidence for Claims Filed After March 
27, 2017: What Is Left of the Treating Physician Rule? 
On January 18, 2017, SSA published final rules 
regarding the weighing of opinion evidence for claims filed 
after March 27, 2017.158 In these final rules, SSA responded 
to public comments submitted after the September 9, 2016 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.; see, e.g., Levy & Glicksman, supra note 113, at 547 (“It may be . . . 
that the rule is the product of judicial mistrust of the SSA rather than a 
generalizable application of the substantial evidence standard.”). But see 
Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 
5,844, 5,857 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416) (stating that 
during the public comment period after the September 2016 notice of proposed 
rulemaking, Professors Levy and Glicksman submitted comments complaining 
that the Agency misrepresented their position on the treating physician rule). 
 157. Schneider, supra note 85, at 415–16. 
 158. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 5,844 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416); see also 20 
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c (2018). 
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notice of proposed rulemaking.159 Commenters were split 
over the treating physician rule.160 Ultimately, the Agency 
stuck to its decision to repeal the rule, relying largely on the 
fourth justification from the notice of proposed 
rulemaking.161 
The regulatory regime for weighing medical opinion 
evidence for claims filed after March 27, 2017 is codified at 
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c & 416.920c. Under the new rules, 
SSA adjudicators no longer give specific evidentiary weight 
or deference to any medical opinion, including a treating 
source opinion.162 Instead, the Agency applies a list of factors 
and articulates how each medical opinion influenced its final 
decision.163 The factors include supportability, consistency, 
relationship to the claimant, specialization, and “other 
factors.”164 While adjudicators use all of these factors in 
evaluating a medical opinion, they need only articulate their 
considerations of supportability and consistency.165 The 
regulations specifically highlight supportability and 
consistency as “the most important factors.”166 
If a medical opinion fulfills the two main factors, 
supportability and consistency, it is a persuasive opinion.167 
 
 159. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“After notice required by this section, the 
agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule 
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments . . . .”). 
 160. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. 
Reg. at 5,852 (“Multiple commenters asked us to retain the current treating 
source rule, while some commenters agreed with our proposal to eliminate it.”). 
 161. See id. at 5,853 (“Since we first adopted the current treating source rule 
in 1991, the healthcare delivery system has changed in significant ways that 
require us to revise our policies in order to reflect this reality.”). 
 162. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a); cf §§ 404.1527, 416.927 
(“Generally, we give more weight to medical opinions from your treating 
sources . . . .”). 
 163. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). 
 164. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5), 416.920c(c)(1)–(5). 
 165. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). 
 166. Id. 
 167. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(2), 416.920c(c)(1)–(2). Because claims filed after 
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An opinion has supportability if the explanations and 
objective medical evidence cited by the source are relevant to 
support the opinion.168 The consistency element requires 
comparison of a medical opinion with other evidence in the 
record. The more consistent the opinion is with evidence from 
other sources, the more persuasive the opinion is.169 
The third factor, relationship with the claimant, is split 
into five sub-factors.170 When analyzing the relationship 
with the claimant, the adjudicator should consider (1) the 
length of the treatment relationship, (2) the frequency of 
examinations, (3) the purpose of the treatment relationship, 
(4) the extent of the treatment relationship, and (5) whether 
there was an examining relationship.171 Specialization, the 
fourth factor, suggests that a medical opinion is more 
persuasive if the source is a specialist in an area relevant to 
the claimant’s conditions.172 Finally, the catch-all 
provision—“other factors”—permits adjudicators to consider 
“other factors that tend to support or contradict” a medical 
opinion.173 
Under this scheme laid out in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c & 
416.920c, remnants of the treating physician rule lie in the 
third factor, “relationship with the claimant.” For example, 
the five sub-factors of factor three are traceable to the factors 
applied under the 1991 rules for weight determination.174 As 
 
March 27, 2017 have not yet reached federal district courts, there is no caselaw 
to explain the application of these factors. 
 168. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). 
 169. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). 
 170. §§ 404.1520c(c)(3), 416.927c(c)(3). 
 171. Id. 
 172. §§ 404.1520c(c)(4), 416.927c(c)(4). 
 173. §§ 404.1520c(c)(5), 416.927c(c)(5) (including, but not limited to, “evidence 
showing a medical source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or 
an understanding of our disability program’s policies and evidentiary 
requirements.”). 
 174. Compare, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(3)(i)–(ii) (listing “length of 
treatment relationship” and “frequency of examinations” in the 2017 regulations) 
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stated above, however, factor three need not be articulated 
in the Agency’s decision. In fact, it is questionable whether 
an adjudicator is required to consider it at all.175 Thus, the 
nature of the relationship between an opinion’s source and 
the claimant is arguably an optional consideration, not 
subject to judicial enforcement or review. For better or for 
worse, the treating physician rule is no longer a viable tool 
for claimants seeking relief from a negative Agency decision 
in federal court. 
  
 
with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i) (listing “length of the treatment relationship 
and frequency of examination” in the 1991 formulation). 
 175. See §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.1520c(a) (“[W]e will consider those medical 
opinions . . . from that medical source together using the factors listed in 
paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.”) (emphasis 
added). The “as appropriate” qualification, the repeated insistence that 
supportability and consistency are the “most important” factors, and the lack of 
articulation requirements for factors three through five suggest the decision to 
consider factors other than supportability and consistency is a matter of Agency 
discretion. 
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III. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF REPEALING THE TREATING 
PHYSICIAN RULE AND PROPOSALS FOR MITIGATING ADVERSE 
IMPACT ON CLAIMANTS 
The treating physician rule was unquestionably due for 
revision. Despite the 1991 switch from common law to 
regulation, the substance of the rule—broad deference or 
“controlling weight” to treating sources—has lingered since 
the middle of the 20th century. SSA presented several 
compelling reasons for repealing the rule in its September 
2016 notice of proposed rulemaking. Perhaps most 
persuasive is the assertion that the U.S. healthcare delivery 
system and the physician-patient relationship have changed 
so radically that there is little justification for keeping the 
rule. Additionally, the Agency understandably wants to 
decrease the number of federal court remands and keep 
control over its unwieldy caseload. 
However, it is important to keep in mind the core 
promise of the Social Security Act: to provide relief to 
individuals vulnerable to financial and social hardships.176 
Despite being somewhat outdated, the treating physician 
rule provided important protections for disability claimants. 
As one commentator pointed out, subjective and contextual 
considerations are inherent to disability determinations.177 
While objective medical evidence is similarly important, an 
individualized assessment by a physician intimately familiar 
with the claimant’s conditions provides invaluable guidance 
for subjective considerations. Since the treating physician is 
capable of “producing the most individualized assessment,” 
the treating physician rule ensured adjudicators favorably 
 
 176. See Brown & Bartlett v. United States, 330 F.2d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 1964) 
(“Generally, in construing the Social Security Act, our court has favored that 
interpretation which gives effect to the beneficent purposes of the Act.”); Arianna 
Tunsky-Brashich, Offsetting Justice: Protecting Federally-Exempt Benefits from 
Garnishment and Bank Set-Offs, 29 BOSTON COLL. THIRD WORLD L.J. 323, 330 
n.49 (2009). 
 177. Schneider, supra note 85, at 415. 
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weighed the best evidence a claimant could produce.178 Thus, 
a wholesale repeal of the treating physician rule raises 
concerns about maintaining individualized assessments in 
Social Security cases. 
This Part proposes two changes to the current rules 
regarding medical opinion evidence to account for potential 
adverse impacts. First, the treating physician rule should 
still be applied to medical opinions written by a claimant’s 
treating psychotherapist or mental health counselor. Second, 
the qualified right to subpoena physicians for hearings 
should be strengthened to more closely resemble an absolute 
right. These two changes will preserve the Agency’s desire to 
modernize the rules of medical opinion evidence while 
upholding some of the important protections the treating 
physician rule provided. 
A. The Treating Physician Rule for Mental Health Care 
Providers 
As discussed above, one of the main justifications SSA 
provided for repealing the treating physician rule was, in the 
Agency’s words, the “devaluation” of the physician-patient 
relationship.179 SSA stated that doctors’ offices have changed 
to accommodate high volumes of patients, delegating patient 
care to a team of providers instead of one physician.180 
Essentially, the Agency argued that physicians and patients 
no longer have the kind of intimate, personalized 
relationships that deserve the deference of the traditional 
treating physician.181 While perhaps compelling in the 
context of primary health care, this argument is 
 
 178. Id. at 411. 
 179. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 62,560, 62,573 (Sept. 9, 2016) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416); see 
supra Part II. 
 180. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 62,573. 
 181. Id. In the January 2017 notice of final rules, the Agency cited several 
medical journals. 
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unpersuasive in the context of psychotherapy and mental 
health counseling. Psychotherapy involves detailed 
discussion of the most intimate details of a person’s life. The 
importance of a quality relationship between 
psychotherapists and their patients is recognized not only in 
the field of psychology, but also by the law. A claimant’s 
psychotherapist undoubtedly still provides the “unique 
perspective” and “detailed, longitudinal” view sought from a 
treating source.182 
In psychological literature, the psychotherapist-patient 
relationship is called the “therapeutic alliance.”183 The very 
nature of the term “alliance” implies a thorough and 
cooperative relationship.184 According to a publication of the 
American Psychological Association, an effective alliance 
requires “trust, understanding[,] and belief from the 
client.”185 Furthermore, the psychotherapist must maintain 
an “acceptable and adaptive” explanation of the client’s 
conditions,186 a requirement echoing the §§ 404.1520c & 
416.920c supportability test.187 Patient engagement in the 
alliance is also important. Patients who are confident in and 
committed to a “positive, valuable [,] and purposeful” 
relationship with their therapists attain more positive 
treatment results.188 
 
 182. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). 
 183. LYNNE KNOBLOCH-FELDERS, PHD, THE FAMILY INSTITUTE AT 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
THERAPIST 1 (2008), https://www.family-institute.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/csi_ 
fedders_relationship_with_therapist.pdf. 
 184. Alliance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/alliance (last visited May 26, 2020). 
 185. A. Brownawell & K. Kelley, Psychotherapy is Effective and Here’s Why, 
MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Oct. 2011, at 14, 14. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1) (stating that medical 
opinion evidence is more persuasive if it contains relevant “supporting 
explanations”). 
 188. Robert L. Hatcher & Alex W. Barends, Patients’ View of the Alliance in 
Psychotherapy: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Three Alliance Measures, 64 J. 
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Given its beneficial impact on treatment outcomes, the 
therapeutic alliance is something that should be fostered by 
the law. Indeed, the importance of the psychotherapist-
patient relationship is already acknowledged in federal 
courts. For example, a psychotherapist-patient privilege is 
recognized under the Federal Rules of Evidence.189 In federal 
proceedings, claims of privilege are governed by common law 
interpreted “in the light of reason and experience” of the 
federal courts.190 Privilege doctrine provides for the exclusion 
of otherwise highly relevant evidence from trial in order to 
“protect interpersonal relationships outside of the 
courtroom.”191 While many privileged relationships have 
been recognized across U.S. jurisdictions, only a few have 
been officially recognized by the Supreme Court. These 
relationships include attorney-client, marital relationships, 
and critically for this analysis, psychotherapist-patient.192 
The Supreme Court first recognized the psychotherapist-
patient privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond. That case revolved 
around the fatal shooting of Ricky Allen by Illinois police 
officer Mary Lu Redmond.193 During discovery, the petitioner 
became aware that Redmond engaged in fifty counseling 
sessions with a licensed social worker after the shooting.194 
 
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1326, 1331–32 (1996). 
 189. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
 190. FED. R. EVID. 501 (1974); see also Christine P. Bartholomew, Exorcising 
the Clergy Privilege, 103 U. VA. L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2017). 
 191. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: 
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 1.1 (3d ed. 2019), Westlaw WIGEVPV. 
 192. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 1; Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second 
Chance—Testimonial Privileges and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS 
L.J. 769, 781–82 (2002). 
 193. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 4. The petitioner, administrator of Allen’s estate, 
brought a civil suit against Redmond alleging deprivation of Allen’s civil rights 
through use of excessive force. Id. A number of factual disputes arose between 
the parties during litigation. For example, while Redmond claimed the shooting 
was lawful because Allen was threateningly wielding a knife, the petitioner 
claimed Allen was unarmed when the incident occurred. Id. 
 194. Id. at 5. 
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Redmond refused petitioner’s request for production of the 
treatment notes from those sessions, claiming they were 
protected by psychotherapist-patient privilege.195 The 
District Court was not swayed by this argument, but 
Redmond’s claim to privilege was vindicated by the Seventh 
Circuit and subsequently by the Supreme Court.196 In its 
holding, the Supreme Court likened the newly found 
psychotherapist privilege to the marital and attorney-client 
privileges, stating the relationship “depends upon an 
atmosphere of confidence and trust.”197 By protecting 
communications from disclosure in a courtroom, the law 
encouraged the development of the “willingness and ability 
to talk freely” required for successful psychiatric 
treatment.198 Furthermore, the Court found the 
psychotherapist privilege served crucial public interests, 
stating in no uncertain terms that “[t]he mental health of our 
citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of 
transcendent importance.”199 
Although the justifications for evidentiary privileges 
differ from those for the treating physician rule, Jaffee still 
illustrates why the treating physician rule should be 
preserved for psychotherapists. The stakes in Jaffee were 
extremely high. The counselor’s treatment notes, after all, 
could have shed light on whether a man was wrongfully 
killed by a police officer. And yet, the Court still found 
exclusion of the evidence was warranted by the compelling 
public policy interests in facilitating effective mental health 
treatment. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in this case cuts 
sharply against SSA’s suggestion that treating physician 
relationships no longer have a place in the modern 
healthcare delivery apparatus, insofar as psychotherapists 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 6, 9–10. 
 197. Id. at 10. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 11. 
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are concerned.200 To the contrary, Jaffee suggests that the 
relationship between psychotherapists and their patients 
maintains a special place in society. In the context of Social 
Security Disability law, treating sources who have this kind 
of relationship with a claimant can still provide the unique 
perspective sought by the treating physician regulations 
applied to pre-2017 applications.201 
Additionally, compared with a treating psychotherapist, 
a consulting source’s opinion may be particularly unreliable 
in the context of mental health. People with mental illness 
face great levels of societal stigma.202 In a 2012 article, 
Professor Christopher Pashler explained the myriad burdens 
carried by claimants with stigmatized disabilities during the 
disability adjudication process.203 Specifically, a claimant 
may use coping mechanisms which impair his ability to 
communicate about his condition with his treating physician, 
an adjudicator, or his own attorney.204 Stunted 
communication may result in an underdeveloped record that 
negatively impacts disability adjudication.205 Expanding on 
Professor Pashler’s argument, it follows that a claimant who 
is guarded around his own physician or lawyer will be even 
more unwilling to communicate with a consulting physician, 
especially a consultative examiner. More often than not, the 
consultative examiner is a stranger to the claimant:206 it is 
 
 200. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 62,560, 62,573 (Sept. 9, 2016) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416). 
 201. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927 (2018). 
 202. See, e.g., Heather Stuart, Fighting the Stigma Caused by Mental 
Disorders: Past Perspectives, Present Activities, and Future Directions, 7 WORLD 
PSYCHIATRY 185, 185–88 (2008). 
 203. See Christopher E. Pashler, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Stigma and 
Denial in Social Security Disability Hearings, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 419 (2012). 
Professor Pashler’s article focuses on the stigma faced by claimants with obesity, 
but he discusses stigma in the context of mental illness as well. 
 204. Id. at 478. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See WITTENBURG, supra note 78, at 26–27. 
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someone paid by the government to complete the 
administrative record. By contrast, as discussed above, a 
claimant’s own counselor or psychologist will have worked to 
build trust and foster an open dialogue necessary for 
psychological treatment. Thus, these treatment sources 
should be presumed more reliable than a consulting 
physician who did not have an opportunity to break through 
the communication barriers faced by claimants with a 
stigmatized mental health condition. 
The solution is simple: require that Agency adjudicators 
give deference to a treating psychotherapist’s opinion about 
the claimant’s mental health conditions. The presumption in 
favor of the treating psychotherapist’s conclusions could still 
be rebutted by applying the §§ 404.1520c & 416.920c 
consistency and supportability factors. This solution would 
ensure, for example, a psychologist who has formed a 
therapeutic alliance with the claimant is presumed more 
reliable than a psychological consultative examiner, who 
only examines the claimant once for the sole purpose of 
producing a report. However, if substantial medical evidence 
contradicted the treating psychologist’s conclusions, an 
adjudicator could find that the opinion fails the consistency 
and supportability tests and rely on the consultative 
examiner’s opinion instead. In this case, the adjudicator 
would still be required to explain how he considered the 
psychologist’s treatment relationship with the claimant. 
Significantly, this approach is consistent with Jaffee and 
privilege doctrine as currently applied under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. While courts continue to apply the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege,207 a generalized 
physician-patient privilege has never been declared.208 
 
 207. See, e.g., United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 178–82 (3d Cir. 2019); 
United States v. Blue, 340 F. Supp. 3d 862 (D.S.D. 2018). 
 208. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) (“[P]hysician-patient 
evidentiary privilege is unknown to the common law.”); Cappetta v. GC Servs. 
Ltd. P’ship, 266 F.R.D. 121, 126 (E.D. Va. 2009); In re Grand Jury Subpoena John 
Doe No. A01-209, 197 F. Supp. 2d 512, 514 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“But no federal 
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Likewise, the rules proposed here for amending the treating 
source rule would not apply outside of the mental health 
context. For the opinions of primary care physicians and 
specialists outside of mental health, the rules for weighing 
medical opinion would apply as written under the current 
regulations.209 
SSA has expressed concerns about laborious articulation 
requirements,210 and it is true that the changes proposed 
here could impose such requirements. This is because the 
ALJ would need to provide an explanation whenever he 
chooses to reject a treating psychotherapist’s opinion. 
However, courts have previously imposed additional duties 
on Agency adjudicators when a claimant’s mental illness is 
at issue. For example, in the context of a disability hearing, 
the ALJ has a heightened duty to fully develop the 
administrative record where a claimant “may be mentally ill 
and thus unable to protect her own interests.”211 Just as an 
ALJ must exercise greater diligence in developing the record 
of a mentally ill claimant, she should similarly take care 
when weighing the medical opinion evidence in the record. 
While the changes proposed here would create an 
articulation burden for adjudicators, the burden is justified 
because it is limited to opinions from mental health care 
providers. Ultimately, these modifications would maintain 
the core of SSA’s changes to the rules for weighing opinion 
 
statute creates a physician-patient privilege, and the federal courts have not 
recognized such a privilege.”); Jenna Phipps, State of Confusion: The Hipaa 
Privacy Rule and State Physician-Patient Privilege Laws in Federal Question 
Cases, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 159 (2007). 
 209. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c (2018). 
 210. That is, the requirement that an ALJ provide detailed explanations for 
the weight afforded to an opinion. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the 
Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 Fed. Reg. 62,560, 62,572 (Sept. 9, 2016) (to 
be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416). 
 211. Struck v. Astrue, 247 F. App’x. 84, 86 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Tonapetyan 
v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Marinez v. Comm’r of Soc. 
Sec., 269 F. Supp. 3d 207, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“The obligation to develop the 
record is enhanced when the disability in question is a psychiatric impairment.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Pashler, supra note 203, at 470. 
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evidence while preserving deference for providers who treat 
within the “atmosphere of confidence and trust” so vital to 
mental health care. 
B. Expansion of the Right to Subpoena Physicians 
The first regulatory change discussed above deals with a 
modification to the rules regarding weighing medical opinion 
evidence. In this Section, I propose a change to a rule 
separate from the medical opinion regulations: the rule 
establishing a qualified right to subpoena physicians in 
disability hearings. For the reasons discussed below, 
changing the qualified right to an absolute or near-absolute 
right could ensure protections similar to the protections that 
used to be provided by the treating physician rule. 
The right to cross-examine witnesses during trial is 
fundamental to the American system of justice.212 However, 
the extent of this right in SSA disability proceedings has long 
been a subject of debate among the federal courts. For its 
part, the Supreme Court provided meager guidance in the 
case of Richardson v. Perales. In an opinion described by 
Professor Victor Rosenblum as “a triumph of verbosity over 
clarity,”213 Justice Blackmun referred to both a claimant’s 
“right” to subpoena a physician and the mere “opportunity” 
for cross-examination.214 Subsequently, the circuit courts 
split over whether the holding in Perales defined an absolute 
right or a qualified right to subpoena physicians for cross-
 
 212. For criminal defendants, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses is a 
Constitutional right. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. While this right is not explicit in 
the Constitution for civil cases or administrative proceedings, judges and scholars 
have noted the importance of cross-examination in all contexts. See, e.g., Greene 
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497 (1959) (“For two centuries past, the policy of the 
Anglo-American system of Evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing 
by cross-examination as a vital feature of the law.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)) (citing 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 213. Victor G. Rosenblum, The Right to Cross-Examine Physicians in Social 
Security Disability Cases, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1999). 
 214. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971); Rosenblum, supra note 
213, at 1049–50. 
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examination.215 SSA regulations follow the “qualified right” 
approach, maintaining that a claimant’s timely subpoena 
request need only be fulfilled if it is “reasonably necessary 
for the full presentation of a case.”216 
One justification for the qualified approach is the 
nonadversarial nature of the adjudication process.217 
Regarding disability proceedings, the Supreme Court has 
stated that SSA “operates essentially . . . as an adjudicator 
and not as an advocate or adversary.”218 Thus, the majority 
in Perales was reluctant to ascribe anti-claimant bias to 
reporting physicians independently contracted with the 
government.219 Because the risk for bias is low, the need for 
cross-examination was reduced in a Social Security hearing, 
and an absolute right to subpoena was unnecessary. In a 
fierce dissent, Justice Douglas balked at this argument, 
accusing the government of recruiting “circuit-riding doctors 
who never see or examine claimants to defeat their 
claims.”220 In a 1999 essay, Professor Rosenblum echoed 
 
 215. For example, the Fifth Circuit took an absolutist approach, interpreting 
Perales to hold that “by requesting a subpoena, a claimant has the right to cross-
examine an examining physician.” Lidy v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 1075, 1077 (5th Cir. 
1990), cert denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991). Several years later, the Sixth Circuit 
rebuked the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, stating “we do not see why cross-
examination should necessarily follow from the filing of a subpoena request that 
fails to comply with a regulation requiring that there be some showing of an 
actual need for cross-examination.” Calvin v. Chater, 73 F.3d 87, 92–93 (6th Cir. 
1996). 
 216. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) (2018). After the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in Lidy, SSA published an acquiescence ruling laying out the difference between 
SSA official policy and the Fifth Circuit’s absolutist approach. See Social Security 
Acquiescence Ruling 91-X(5), 56 Fed. Reg. 67,625 (1991). However, the Agency 
agreed to apply the absolutist approach in all Fifth Circuit cases. Id. 
 217. Rosenblum, supra note 213, at 1062–65. 
 218. Perales, 402 U.S. at 403. 
 219. Id. at 402–03. 
 220. Id. at 413. Justice Douglas further reasoned that reporting physicians 
were likely to be “defense-minded” and proceeded to lambast the government for 
using a “stable of defense doctors without submitting them to cross-examination.” 
Id. at 414. Other courts have implied that physicians paid by the government 
may be biased against claimants. See, e.g., Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 
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Justice Douglas’s sentiments and called for the recognition 
of cross-examination in disability hearings as an “integral 
component of fairness” that should not be weakened by 
“pretenses of nonadversariality.”221 
The repeal of the treating physician rule provides new 
perspective to the ongoing debate over the right to subpoena 
physicians in disability proceedings. Regardless of whether 
Justice Douglas’s accusations were accurate, the treating 
physician rule equipped claimants with a tool to overcome 
anti-claimant biases from reporting or consulting physicians 
if such biases existed. This is because the regulations 
required great deference to the claimant’s treating physician, 
while generally providing little weight to consulting 
physicians and state Agency consultants.222 So, even if an 
Agency-paid physician held biases, the claimant could rest 
easy knowing his own physician’s report had to be given 
controlling weight, or alternatively, an adjudicator had to 
explain how the treatment relationship of each physician 
was considered.223 In that environment, a qualified right to 
subpoena was more justified because of the protective rules 
for weighing opinion evidence. For example, if a claimant 
was denied the opportunity to cross-examine a consulting 
physician, that report would ultimately not be as strongly 
weighted as the claimant’s treating physician’s report. 
This justification for the qualified approach, however, no 
longer exists after the repeal of the treating physician rule. 
Under the qualified approach, claimants face a situation 
 
412 (10th Cir. 1983) (“In determining the question of substantiality of evidence, 
the reports of physicians who have treated a patient over a period of time or who 
are consulted for purposes of treatment are given greater weight than are reports 
of physicians employed and paid by the government . . . .”). 
 221. Rosenblum, supra note 213, at 1065 (“[T]he SSA is about as 
nonadversarial as whiskey is nonalcoholic.”). 
 222. See supra Section II.B. 
 223. It could be argued that this arrangement simply replaces anti-claimant 
bias in favor of pro-claimant bias. While it may be impossible to eliminate biases 
entirely, it is more justifiable to permit bias from physicians with the most 
thorough understanding of the claimant’s conditions. 
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where an adjudicator can both rely on a physician’s report 
without acknowledging that physician’s treatment 
relationship with the claimant and deny the claimant an 
opportunity to cross-examine that physician. Because SSA 
removed the protection of the treating physician rule, a 
stronger right—though not necessarily an absolute right—to 
subpoena should be enforced. For example, Professor 
Rosenblum suggests the appropriate solution is shifting the 
burden of proof.224 Instead of placing the burden on the 
claimant to show the necessity of cross-examination, the 
Agency would have to demonstrate through clear and 
convincing evidence that cross-examination is 
unwarranted.225 While this right can be enforced through 
new regulations, it can also be enforced judicially through 
greater scrutiny of subpoena denials.226 
  
 
 224. See Rosenblum, supra note 213, at 1065. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Under the current regulations, a subpoena can be denied if it is not 
“reasonably necessary” for the presentation of the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) 
(2018). Thus, courts could require greater evidence to meet the “reasonably 
necessary” standard in light of the treating physician rule repeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Comment has provided a comprehensive overview 
of the treating physician rule from its common-law origins to 
its repeal. Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, 
courts applied the rule to provide oversight for final Agency 
decisions. By 2017, the Agency determined the rule was no 
longer helpful in disability decisions and repealed it through 
standard notice and comment rulemaking. While there are 
persuasive justifications for repealing the rule, further 
changes should be considered to protect the individualized 
assessment that treating physicians contribute to the 
decision-making process. 
The disability adjudication process will never be perfect. 
As the federal administrative state continues to expand, 
agencies must constantly revise and re-examine their rules. 
Different values must be balanced and calibrated to keep 
consistent with those of society. All things considered, the 
repeal of the treating physician rule is a reasonable action in 
light of the rapid changes to our healthcare system and high 
remand rates. That is not to say, however, that there should 
never be a place for the rule. Going beyond just the proposals 
of this Comment, SSA must be willing to stay flexible to 
accommodate changes to protect fair process for claimants. 
Americans entrust the Social Security Administration with 
the awesome responsibility of managing social welfare for 
the most vulnerable among us. In order to carry out this 
duty, the Agency must continue to consider all the tools at its 
disposal, including those that may seem old-fashioned or 
outdated. We should continue to examine the rules for 
weighing medical opinion evidence and change them 
accordingly to maximize fairness for beneficiaries. 
